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CATHOLIC AND EVANGELICAL SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES: A
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

ROBERT
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JR. *

The last three decades have witnessed a substantial growth in Catholic
and evangelical! influence on public life in the United States. Three of the
last five presidents (Carter, Clinton, and G.W. Bush) were evangelicals and
evangelicals were widely credited with having elected the other two (Reagan and G.H.W. Bush). Five of the nine Supreme Court justices (Scalia,

* Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director, Institute on
Law, Religion, and Ethics, Pepperdine University. Portions of this essay appeared earlier in "The
Catholic Court Appeal: Why So Many Catholic Justices on the Supreme Court? Why Now?"
TOUCHSTONE 40-45 (July/August 2006). Other portions were given as a speech at the University
of St. Thomas Law Journal Symposium, Minneapolis, Minnesota, November 10, 2006, entitled
"Catholicism and the Court: The Relevance of Faith Traditions to Jurisprudence." Other portions
of it were stimulated by questions and comments made at that conference. My thanks to the
organizers and participants of that conference for their contribution to the conference and to my
thinking. Thanks a~ well to my able research assistant Jeff Hassler for his assistance and wise
counsel.
1. Evangelicals are part of a large, very diverse family, which includes Dutch Calvinists,
most African-Americans, Mennonites, South American Pentecostals, Catholic Charismatics,
Southern Baptists, and those who attend American megachurches. There are evangelicals in almost every church, evangelical churches in almost every denomination, and fifty-two denominations in the National Association of Evangelicals. See http://www.nae.netl.
Evangelicals have two central beliefs in common. First is the importance of a new birth in
Christ. Jesus told Nicodemus, a religious leader of his day, "You must be born again." John 3:7;
see John 3: 1-21 (all biblical quotations herein are from the New International Version). Evangelicals preach the good news that though we have all sinned, Christ died for our sins. Anyone can
turn from his or her sins, accept God's forgiveness, and follow Christ. Following Christ gives one
a personal relationship with God, a meaningful life today, and eternal life with God. Evangelicals
are called to share this good news to others.
Second, evangelicals believe in the authority of scripture. The reliability of scripture is based
on the reliability of its writers. The authors of the New Testament-the portion of the scripture
that describes Jesus and the early church-were willing to die rather than recant what they wrote.
Evangelical ethics are a response to God's grace. The substance is captured by the bracelets
that evangelical kids wear that say "WWJD"-"What would Jesus do?" The evangelical environmentalists' question, "Would Jesus drive an SUV?" is, or should be, a compelling question for
evangelicals. The question for an evangelical member of the Supreme Court would be, "What
would Jesus do if he were a Supreme Court justice?"
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Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and AUto) are now Catholic.:! All of the
Catholics on the Court were appointed in the last twenty years and in the
prior 200 years only seven Catholics were appointed to the Court. 3 Though
it has been almost a century since an evangelical joined the Court,4 it is
likely that with the growing evangelical political and cultural influence, we
will see evangelicals appointed to the Court in coming decades.
The growth in the number of Catholic justices is, in part, a result of the
approach that Catholics have taken toward American culture, including law.
In this essay, I will first consider the approaches that Catholics and
evangelicals have taken toward culture. Whereas Catholics have consistently been engaged with the culture, during most of the twentieth century,
2. The 112 Supreme Court justices have included forty-one Episcopalians. twenty
Presbyteriuns, and five Methodists. There have also been eight Unitarian and seven Jewish justices. or the others currently on the Court, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer arc Jewish and Justices
Stevens and Souter are Protestant. For a list of the Justices over the history of the Coun and their
religious faiths. see THE Sl;PREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS. AND DEVELOPMENT
239-50 (Lee Epstein et a!. cds .. 2d ed. 1996).
3. See id.

4. For explorations of the religious views of the justices, see Thomas C. Berg & Willi,lIn G.
Ross, Some Religi(Jus/v Devollt Justices: Historica/ Notes and C(Jmments. 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383
(1998) and JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND REUGION IN AMERICAN LIFE. VOL II.
77-108 (2004). Unlike Catholics and Jews, whose religious faith can generally be identified by
their birth. membership in a religious congregation, or both, being an evangelical is a matter of
sharing thc religious beliefs and commitments melllioned supra at note I. Whereas, it is generally
e1ear whether someone is Jewish or Catholic, it is not always clear whether someone is an evangelical. Some denominations. e.g., Baptists, Dutch Calvinists, Mennonites, are predominantly evangelical, so membership within one of those denominations might e,tablish a presumption that
one is an evangelical. One's statements that contradict evangelical beliefs might rebut that presumption. But evangelicals can be found within a variety of Christian denominations. To determine whether one from outside of an evangelical denomination is an cvangelical, we might look
to that person's beliefs. That can be a difficult matter with some, who hold that religion is a
private matter. but evangelicals believc that they are called on to share their faith. A person's
statements may mark him or her as an evangelicaL
The last evangelical on the Court was probably James C. McReynolds, who served on the
Court from 1914-1941. He has been described as "a pious lifelong member of the Disciples of
Christ (Campbellites)," HITCHCOCK, supra at 88. but he is an unfortunate representative of the
evangelical faith. "Racist and anti-Semitic. he has been called the most higoted person ever to sit
on the Court [though] the two decisions concerning religion that he wrole~Meyer (1923) [upholding the right to teach German in sehools] and Pierce (1925) [guaranteeing the frcedom of
private religious schoolsJ-became liberal landmarks." Id. (citing JAMES E. BOND, I DrsSrST: THE
LEGACY OF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK McREyr-;OLDS (1992)). More attractive evangelical justices
David Brewer and (the first) John Marshall Harlan preceeded MeReynolds, serving on the Court
from 1889-19lO and 1877-1911, respectively. See iLl. at 85-86. Brewer, whose parents were
American missionaries to Turkey, said that Harlan "goes to bed every night with one hand on the
Constitution and the other hand on the Bihle." See Berg & Ross, supra at 386, :'89-90. 393-94.
For a brief description of a few of their eases. see intra text accompanying note 35.
Justices Charles Evan, Hughes and Hugo L. Black, are both listed in the SliPREME CO!lRT
COMPENDIUM. supra note 2 at 239-50. as Baptists (generally an indication of evangelical faith).
but Hughes rejected orthodox Christianity while in college and Black. according to his son, had
rejected many Baptist beliefs by the time he came to Washington and attended a Unitarian church
toward the end of his life. See HITCHCOCK supra at 90 and 92 and sources cited therein.

298

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:2

evangelicals withdrew from it. It has only been in the last three decades
that evangelicals have reengaged the culture.
Then I will consider three aspects of Catholic and evangelical theology
that are likely to influence law. These doctrines address the nature of law,
community, and religious freedom. The Catholic doctrine concerning law is
natural law; the analogous evangelical doctrine is common grace. The Catholic doctrine concerning community is subsidiarity; the analogous evangelical doctrine is sphere sovereignty. Catholics and evangelicals now share a
common commitment to the doctrine of religious freedom.
In my view, the Catholic doctrines help to explain the substantial
growth in the number of Catholics appointed to the Court in recent decades. 5 My argument is not that presidents who nominate, citizens who support, and senators who confirm Catholic candidates to the Court are
necessarily aware of the Catholic doctrines. The candidates themselves may
not know the doctrines by name. My argument is that candidates formed in
a Catholic culture that is shaped by these doctrines develop habits of thinking that make them attractive Supreme Court candidates.
Many legal scholars, both liberal and conservative, argue for very different reasons that religious faith has no place in legal decision making. At
the end of this essay, I will consider that position and argue that while the
range of cases in which religiously grounded insights affect judges' decisions should be narrow, religious influences in some cases are both unavoidable and valuable. Though this essay focuses on Catholic and
evangelical understandings of law, other religious traditions have much to
add to an understanding of law as well. 6

5. One political explanation for the appointment of so many Catholics to the Court in recent
decades is that the political parties want to attract Catholic citizens, who are swing voters. Historically, Catholics were Democrats, but with the Democratic Party's embrace of abortion rights in
the 1970s, many Catholics began to vote Republican. The bad news for Catholics is that they are
without a political home; the good news is that each party would like to draw them into its home.
Republican presidents, who want to attract Democratic voters (and want a pro-life Supreme Court)
appoint Catholic justices. Democratic senators, who do not want to offend Catholic voters, vote to
confirm Catholic appointees. Evangelicals, who also tend to be pro-life, are generally more individualistic on economic issues than Catholics, and therefore are more comfortable in the Rcpublican Party. They have a political home in the Republican Party, but they tend to be taken for
granted. Of course even this political explanation for the appointment of Catholic justices to the
Court is related to Catholic theological beliefs. The Catholic pro-life position led Catholics from
the Democratic Party and makes them attractive Supreme Court candidates for pro-life
Republicans.

6. See FAITH AND LAW: How RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW
AMERICAN LAW (ed. Robert F. Cochran, Jr.) (NYU Press, forthcoming) (authors from sixteen
different religious traditions discuss how tbeir traditions view law).
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CATHOLICS, EVANGELICALS, AND CULTURE IN AMERICA?

During the nineteenth century, a period of explosive growth of both
Catholics (through immigration) and evangelicals (through conversion) in
the United States, both groups were socially and politically active. Among
Catholics, that activity has continued to the present. Social and political
engagement is a deeply-rooted Catholic practice. Catholics are what H.
Richard Niebuhr, in his classic Christ and Culture, called "synthesizers."s
Under the influence of Thomas Aquinas, Catholics synthesize Christian
faith and culture, drawing on the best aspects of both. Aquinas "combined
without confusing philosophy and theology, state and church, civic and
Christian virtues, natural and divine laws, Christ and culture."9 A later section of this essay discusses the legal manifestation of this synthesis in natural law. Catholics were synthesizing Christian faith and culture before they
came to the United States, and that synthesis has continued as they have
moved into leadership positions in culture-forming institutions, including
the legal profession, in the United States.
Whereas Catholics have had a growing involvement with culture, including law, from the nineteenth century to the present, the evangelical
story is significantly different. Though they had a different style during the
nineteenth century, evangelicals, like Catholics, were culturally engaged.
Evangelicals at that time tended to be what Niebuhr called "conversionists."lo They sought to convert the culture in many respects, advocating the
abolition of slavery, the adoption of child labor laws, the emancipation of
women, and the prohibition of alcohol sales. But early in the twentieth century, in what some historians have called "the great reversal,'>! I evangelicals withdrew from the culture into evangelical enclaves. They took a
position toward culture that Niebuhr labeled "separatist." This did not put
them in a position to influence the culture or to move into leadership roles
within it.
It was not until the eady 1970s that evangelicals in large numbers reengaged the broader American culture. 12 Since that time, evangelicals have
7, For evangelicals' and Catholics' cultural history in the United States, see NATHAN
HATCH, THE DE~OCRATIZATION OF A~ERICAN CHRISTlANITY (1989); MARK NOLL, THE SCANDAL
OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND (1994); and JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN
FREEDOM: A HISTORY (2003),
8, H, RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CCLTURE 116-48 (1951).
9. Id. at 130.
10, [d.
I L See, e,g., GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALIS~

30 (1991).
12, Carl Henry was one of the early evangelical leaders to call for evangelieal re-engagement

in social and legal concerns, CARL F. H, Hf:NRY, THE C"IEASY CONSCIENCE OF MODER"I Fli"lDA,
(Eerdmans 1947). He and other "neo-evangelicals" laid the groundwork for the evangelical re-engagement that was to emerge later in the century. In 1973, a broad range of
evangelicals met and issued the Chicago Declaration of Evangelical Social Concern. They confessed the failure of evangelicals to be involved in important social issues, confessed their responMENTALlS~
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become increasingly active in public life,13 but good Supreme Court candidates do not emerge overnight. The lack of involvement of evangelicals in
the culture during most of the twentieth century helps to explain the dearth
of evangelicals on the Court, but a generation of potential evangelical candidates is emerging.

II.

LAW-RELATED ASPECTS OF CATHOLIC AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

A.

Natural Law and Common Grace

The first Catholic doctrine is natural law. Natural law's most dominant
proponent through the ages has been Thomas Aquinas. Influential proponents today include Catholics John Finnis, Robert George, and Russell Hittinger. 14 Natural law teaches that we as humans were created with a nature
and that, through reason, we can discern moral values as well as laws that
will conform to that nature and enable us to live the fullest lives. There are
"goods"-things that humans universally value such as life, knowledge,
recreation, beauty, and friendship-and through reason voters, legislators,
and judges can develop laws that will maximize those goods for individuals
and the community.
Judicial candidates who think in a natural law framework are attractive
to the American people because natural law thinking is consistent with our
national traditions. The United States was founded on natural law, and the
documents the Founders drafted are full of the language of natural law. The
Founders declared independence based on "the laws of nature and of nature's God" and on the "self-evident" truth that humans "are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rights."Is Not only were the country's
founding documents rooted in natural law, so also was the everyday work
of everyday lawyers. The "bible" for early American lawyers (when it
wasn't the Bible) was Blackstone's Commentaries, volumes explicitly
sibility for racism and sexism, and declared their opposition to poverty and materialism. MaIjorie
Hyer of The Washington Post wrote prophetically that their meeting "could well change the face
of both religion and politics in America." (quoted in JOEL A. CARPENTER, Compassionate Evan-

gelicalism: How a Document Conceived 30 Years Ago Has Prompted Us to Care More About "the
Least of These", http://www.christianitytoday.com/ctl200310 12/2.40.html).
13. In my view, evangelicals are now spread across Niebuhr's range of approaches to culture,
Some remain separatists and some have become conversionists. Others are dualists (seeing little
connection between the Christian faith and culture) or culturalists (seeing little distinction between
the Christian faith and culture). For a summary of Niehbur's categories and their manifestation in
law, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Traditions, Culture, and Law, in CHRIST/AN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael w. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran Jr. & Angela C. Carmella
eds.,2001).

14. See, e.g., JOHN FINN IS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); NATURAL LAW
THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert P. George ed., 1992); and RUSSELL Hl1TINGER, THE
FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN THE POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003).
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras 1-2 (U.S. 1776).
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based on naturallaw. 16 Abraham Lincoln, trained as a lawyer in the back of
a law office by reading Blackstone, led the nation to eliminate slavery with
speeches that were full of natural law.
There were few Catholics present at the founding of the United
States. 17 It is therefore ironic that in the twentieth century Catholics became
the guardians of natural law in the United States. In the twentieth century,
natural law grew into disfavor among the Protestant and increasingly secular legal intellectuals. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the most influential American legal thinker of the last century, indirectly scorned natural law as "a
brooding omnipresence in the sky."18 His views, that moral preferences are
arbitrary, law is merely power, and "truth" is the position of the nation that
can lick any other, became increasingly influential during the twentieth century on both the left and the righLI9 Critical legal studies, feminism, and
critical race theory teach that law is merely the power play of judges and
their economic classes. The law and economics theory teaches that the
proper ground of law is efficiency.2° Words like "justice" and "rights" that
are rooted in natural law jurisprudence mean little in a legal world consisting only of power and efficiency.
Natural law never really disappeared from the American legal scene.
Despite the loss of natural law language, most of the rights arguments of the
twentieth century-for example, arguments against the Holocaust, racial
discrimination, and prisoner abuse-were based on natural law. Justice
Jackson's arguments at Nuremberg were natural law arguments-the Nazis
had committed crimes against humanity.21 Martin Luther King, Jr., in his
Letter from a Birmingham Jail, quoted both scripture and Thomas Aquinas
to support his argument that H[a]n unjust law is no law at all."22
Natural law received little attention within legal intellectual circles
during most of the twentieth century until the publication of John Finnis's
Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1979. Now, natural law has re-emerged
as a leading legal theory, and Catholics, who had never given up on natural
law theory, have taken the lead in that analysis.
Many evangelicals draw insights from a combination of sources that
yield something very similar to natural law. For evangelicals, the primary
16. See William Blackstone. Commentaries on the Laws of England, sec. 2 (1865). availahle
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlblackstone/introa.htm#2.

17. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCI.
OLOGY 151 (:-lew York: Doubleday 1955).
18. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205.222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK. AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2001).
20. See generally Chicago Lectures in Law and Economics (Eric A. Posner ed., 2(00).
21. See, e.g., European Navigators, Opening address by Robert H. Jackson (Nov. 21, 1945),
http://www.ena.lu/europe/pioneering/opening-address-robert-jacksoo-ouremberg- 1945 .hlm (opening address of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg).
22. Martin Luther King. Jr.. Letterfrom Birmingham City Jail (1963), in AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 517 (Kermit L. Hall et al. cds., 2d ed .. 1996).
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source of authority is the Bible, which notes that those who do not have the
scriptures have the law "written on their hearts.'m Many American
evangelicals have a positive view of reason and the human ability to discern
right and wrong. This view has its roots in the Scottish Enlightenment's
Common Sense philosophy,24 but it is compatible with natural law's notion
that humans have a natural capacity to know the good.
Even those evangelicals who have a Calvinist skepticism about reason
and human nature believe that God gave a measure of "common grace" to
all people. Common grace inc1udes some human ability to discern right and
wrong without scripture, though the term attributes such insights to God. 25
One of the most thoughtful proponents of common grace was Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). He was a philosopher, theologian, journalist,
founder of the Free University of Amsterdam, and Prime Minister of Holland. Kuyper opposed the tendency, which he saw in the Calvinist churches
of Holland, to withdraw from culture (a tendency which as we have seen
was manifested among evangelicals in America during much of the twentieth century). He said, "[i]f God is sovereign, then his Lordship must remain
over all life and cannot be closed up within church walls or Christian circles."26 At the root of common grace is the doctrine of creation. "[T]he
Savior of the world is also the Creator of the world."27 Kuyper criticized
Christians who separate nature and grace, as if nature is something separate
from God's reign. "What we call nature is everything that has its origin and
law in the original creation.',28 Kuyper saw common grace as the basis for
the Christian calling to engage with culture.
Aspects of Kuyper's philosophy are clearly in tension with natural law.
Kuyper anticipated postmodern philosophers in recognizing that there are
great differences in the way that humans with different cultural backgrounds view the world. He attributed this to our fallen nature; according to
Kuyper, we may seek to convey "universal human insight" but our insights
are always colored by our own egos,29 Kuyper saw great challenges for
humans seeking to come to agreement about issues of peace and justice. As
Nicholas Wolterstorff notes, Kuyper did not expect to find principles that
"are such that we can fairly ask everybody to appeal to them when debating
23. Romans 2:15.
24. See, e.g.. George M. Marsden. Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of
Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism: 1870-1925 16 (1980).
25. See 1. Budziszewski. Evangelicals in the Public Square 35-37. 136-38 (2006) and
sources cited therein.
26. Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace, in ABRAHAM KUYPER: A CEISTENNIAL READER 166
(James D. Bratt ed., 1998) [hereinafter Kuyper Reader].
27. Id. at 173; Abraham Kuyper, Selected Works (Nicholas P. Wolterstorff ed.) in 2 THE
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE 242 (John Witte, lr.
& Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006).
28. Kuyper Reader. supra note 26, at 175.
29. See Kuyper, supra note 27, at 301.
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and deciding basic political issues."3o Nevertheless, Kuyper's life and work
illustrate his constant effort to determine how diverse groups of people
might find peace and justice together. He favored what Wolterstorff has
called an "[e]ngaged pluralism."31 Through human interaction, Kupyer
notes, many convictions that were once "entertained by individual thinkers"
have become "the common property of the universal human
consciousness."32
In my view, as an evangelical, natural law is a manifestation of common grace and evangelicals should join with Catholics in advocating and
exploring natural law. 33 Within the natural law framework, there is plenty
of room for evangelicals to argue for the limitations that we see in some
views of natural law.
One great advantage of both natural law and common grace is that
they provide a basis for law that can be shared among those of various
religions and of no religious faith. I believe that judicial decisions should
generally be expressed in natural law terms, rather than explicitly religious
terms. As Kent Greenawalt and Stephen Carter have noted, a judicial opinion "is not an explanation of how a decision was reached, but rather a formalized justification for it."34 Law expressed in natural law terms is more
likely to generate public support than law expressed in religious terms.
What might decisions influenced by natural law (and common grace)
look like? We may gain some insight from the decisions of Catholic and
evangelical justices of the past. Catholics and evangelicals can point with
pride to some decisions. Evangelical Justice John Marshall Harlan-the
first Justice Harlan-dissented in Plessy v. Ferguson against the "separate
but equal doctrine" and evangelical Justice David Brewer, the son of Turkish missionaries, was a firm voice against the xenophobic tendencies of the
late nineteenth century.35 Catholic Justice Pierce Butler cast the sole dissenting vote against forced sterilization in Buck v. Bell, where secularist
Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the eight-man majority, declared that
"three generations of imbeciles are enough."36 Catholic Justice Frank Murphy cast one of the few dissents in Korematsu, the Japanese internment
case. 37
30. Nicholas Wolterstorff. Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), in I THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE 299 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander
eds., 2006); see also id. at 298-309.
31. Id. at 304.
32. Id. at 305.
33. For additional evangelical arguments for natural law, see STEPHEN J. GRABILL, REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN REFORMED THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (2006).
34. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 932,
943 (19119) (citing KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239
(1988)).
35. See Berg & Ross, supra note 4, at 389-90, 393-94 and cases cited therein.
36. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
37. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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I will add, however, that Catholics and evangelicals do not always get
it right. Catholic Justice Roger Taney wrote the Dred Scott decision, which
held that blacks were not "citizens" entitled to bring cases in federal courts
under diversity jurisdiction and that they were not included in the Constitution's references to "We the People" or "persons."38 Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was in fact a very positivist, very un-Catholic opinion, for
it ignored the natural law insight that "all men are created equal." Justice
Joseph Bradley, who had an evangelical background,39 wrote a concurring
opinion in 1873 upholding Illinois' decision to reject Myra Bradwell's petition to practice law. He said, "[t]he constitution of the family organization,
which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood."40
A belief in natural law can lead one in a variety of directions. Our
human tendency is to assume that what we see around us is natural. There is
a danger that practices that are common at a certain time and place, like
slavery and gender roles, will get the unreflective stamp of natural law. The
theory of natural law has been used over the centuries to justify great evils
and it is often used to merely justify the existing order.41 But natural law
also provides one of the few bases for challenging the status quo-observe
the witness of Martin Luther King. Natural law points to a higher law, one
that can correct existing law. The remaining doctrines that I will discusssubsidiarity, sphere sovereignty, and religious freedom-can all be seen as
part of the natural law.
B.

Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty

The Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity and the evangelical Dutch Calvinist doctrine of sphere sovereignty (both developed in the late nineteenth
century) hold that a broad range of intermediate communities between the
individual and the state are essential for human flourishing.
Subsidiarity, which dates from Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum
Novarum (Of New Things) in 1891, recognizes that humans are social beings who need a broad range of relationships. Though he did not use the
term, Leo presented subsidiarity as an alternative to the ideologies of radical individualism and Marxist collectivism. Subsidiarity recognizes the importance of the individual, but because the individual is important,
38. Dred Seott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
39. See, e.g., HrrcHcocK supra note 4 at 83. Bradley's unorthodox beliefs and religious
skepticism probably would place him outside of the evangelical fold. One could imagine, however, some evangelicals using Scripture to reinforce cultural stereotypes about the types of profession that are appropriate for women.
40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
41. See. e.g., Ali Kahn, The Dignity of lnbor, 32 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 289, 338 n.205
(2001) (noting that "natural law has been invoked to entrench the status quo, old traditions, and
prejudicial beliefs").

2006]

A THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

305

intermediate associations-families. religious congregations. labour unions,
businesses, private benevolent foundations, and local communities-are
important.
Pope John Paul II's Centesimus Annus, The Economics of Human
Freedom, an encyclical commemorating Rerum No va rum , s IOOth anniversary, says:
The principle of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of a
higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but
rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its
activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a
view to the common good. Needs are best understood and satistIed by people who are closest to them, and who act as neighbors
to those in needY
The doctrine of subsidiarity seeks to keep individuals and intermediate
communities strong and independent. not to make them dependent on the
state. If such institutions are at risk, a larger institution should step in and
aid them with the objective of making them independent again. As Jean
Bethke Elshtain has said, "[ c]ommunities must enable and encourage individuals to exercise their self-responsibility and larger communities must do
the same for smaller ones."43
The doctrine of sphere sovereignty was developed by Kuyper, who
believed that God delegates authority to the state, but that he also delegates
authority to other entities-including the church, families, universities,
guilds, and other associations-each of which is sovereign within its
sphere. 44 Kuyper recognized two special responsibilities for the state:
[The State] must provide for sound mutual interaction among the
various spheres, insofar as they are externally manifest, and keep
them within just limits. Furthermore, since personal life can be
suppressed by the group in which one lives, the state must protect
the individual from the tyranny of his own circle.
Nevertheless, he warned, "[d]o not forget that every State power tends
to look upon all liberty with a suspicious eye."45 Obviously, subsidiarity
and sphere sovereignty are quite similar, though, as the names imply, sub42. John Paul II, Centesimus Anllus, The Economics oj'Humall Freedom (1991), reprinted in
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD 285, 301 (1992); for a similar description of subsidiarity. see Pope Pius XI. Quadragesimo Anno (1931), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS I" THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT 228, 230 (Ann Frcmantle ed., 1956).
43. Jean Bethke Eishtain, Catholic Social Thought, the City, and Liberal America, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM 97, 105 (Kenneth L. Grasso el al. eds., 1995)
(citing Joseph A. Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Questiof!, 48 THE
JURIST 298,301-02 (1988».
44. Abraham Kuyper, Sphere Sovereignty (George Kump trans., 1880) in Kuyper Reader,
supra note 26, at 468.
45. [d. at 472.
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sidiarity allows greater interaction between the levels of community, and
sphere sovereignty gives greater autonomy to the various communities.
The doctrines of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty create attractive
habits of thought in potential Supreme Court justices for several reasons.
First, they provide a reasonable middle course between the extremes of individualism and collectivism. Individualism posits that choice, self-determination, and self-fulfillment are the highest goals of human life. But an overemphasis on individualism has left many people feeling isolated and alone.
The breakdown of the family and of voluntary associations (as documented
in Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone46 ) has left many Americans longing for
community. On the other hand, the collapse of collectivist regimes around
the world in the last twenty-five years demonstrated that the large social
community, by itself, is not an adequate source of human fulfillment either.
Subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty recognize the need for a broad range of
communities and for a balance between freedom and responsibility. They
see important roles for the individual, intermediate communities, and the
broader community.
Second, subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty are consistent with our nation's traditions. They call us back to one of America's great strengths.
Tocqueville noted that one of the distinctive things about Americans was
our tendency to create and join associations. 47 Intermediate associations
help to insure a vibrant, reform-minded people, because those who learn to
interact effectively within smaller groups develop a skill that enables them
to interact effectively in the broader community.
Finally, the doctrines of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty are likely
to yield justices who have a good sense of the balance of powers within our
federal system. Note the parallel between subsidiarity, sphere sovereignty,
and our federal system: all are based in part on the recognition that humans
tend to be selfish and to use power for their own benefit. Since humans tend
to abuse power, it is best to spread it around. In fact, the federal system can
be seen as a manifestation of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty-independent institutions of various sizes, each with separate responsibilities to the
individual and to each other. It should not be surprising that the renewal of
attention to federalism in recent decades has come with the leadership of
Catholic justices.
These doctrines suggest a pattern of judicial restraint. Judicial restraint,
like subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty, is based on the view that powerful
institutions should limit their power and empower others. At its root, judicial restraint is a matter of deferring to other branches of government and to
state and local governments. Powerful institutions should limit their power
46. See generally
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(2001).
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and empower others. Courts that exercise judicial restraint defer to other
branches of government and to state and local governments. Power should
be shared across many institutions within society, both because power corrupts and because a division of responsibility enables different institutions
to do what they do best.
C.

Religious Freedom

On the final doctrine, religious freedom, evangelicals were far ahead of
Catholics. Indeed, Catholic support for religious freedom was a historic reversal of the Catholic Church's traditional view that "error has no rights."48
Prior to Vatican II, there was little religious freedom in Catholic countries.
The Second Vatican Council adopted as strong a statement of religious freedom as has ever been crafted: Dignitatis Humanae declared the desire for
freedom of religion "to be greatly in accord with truth and justice."49
[TJhe right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very
dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the
revealed Word of God and by reason itself. This right of the
human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right. 50
Pope John Paul II embraced religious freedom as well, proclaiming
that "[t]he Church imposes nothing, she only proposes."5! The embrace of
religious freedom by Catholics removed the fear of many Protestants that
Catholics on the Court would cut back on religious freedom. In my view,
were it not for the Catholic embrace of religious freedom, Protestants would
have greatly limited the number of Catholics on the Court.
Support for religious freedom among evangelicals came much earlier
than among Catholics. In the early days of the Reformation, while
Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans were fighting over who would run governments and establish the religions of European countries, Anabaptist
evangelicals were arguing that the decision to follow Christ was by nature
an individual decision. 52 Baptist evangelicals in early America shared the
Anabaptist beliefs in salvation as an individual decision and baptism after
48. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
662, 669 (1993).
49. Declaration On Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, On The Right Of The Persoll
And Of Communities To Social And Civil Freedom In Matters Religious (Dec. 7. 1965), http://
www.vatican. valarchivcfhisCcouncilsliL vatican_council/documentsfvat -ii_decl_19651207_
dignitatis-humanac_en.html.
50. Id.
5!' Pope John Paul It Redemptoris Missio (Dec. 7, 1990). http://www.vatican.va!holy_fathcr/john_pauUi/cncyclicals/documentsfhfj p-ii_enc_ 07121990_redemptoris-missio_en.htm I.
52. See. e.g., MaryAnn Schlegel Ruegger, An Audience for the Amish: A Communication
Based Approach to the Development of Law, 66 IND. LJ. 80 I. 804-05 (1991) ("The Anabaptists
originated as one of scveral factions within the Reform movement that desired additional changes
to which neither Luther nor Zwingli would agree .... [TJhe dissenting factions [Anabaptists]
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conversion. Both came to support religious freedom, in part, no doubt, because they were subjected to religious persecution, but also because they
believed that conversion, by its very nature, is a matter of free choice. 53
In this area, as well as the other two areas I have discussed, Abraham
Kuyper is one of the most articulate evangelical spokesmen. "[T]he church
of Christ can never exert influence on civil society directly, only indirectly."54 "By its influence on the state and civil society the church of
Christ aims only at a moral triumph, not at the imposition of confessional
bonds nor at the exercise of authoritarian control."55
Finally, let me note that there are obvious tensions between many of
the doctrines described above. The existence of natural law might suggest
that judges should discern and implement the best law-it might suggest
activist judging. But the doctrines of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty
suggest that judges should exercise judicial restraint and defer to intermediate associations and individuals. As with so many things, the challenge is to
find the right balance. The argument of this essay is that wise justices who
draw from the resources of the Catholic and evangelical traditions are wellpositioned to strike that balance.
III.

SHOULD RELIGION AFFECT

How

JUDGES VOTE?

Many liberal and conservative legal theorists argue that ajudge's religion should not affect judicial decisions. Liberal theorists want constitutional
cases resolved based on secular moral values. 56 In contrast, conservative
theorists argue that judges should exercise judicial restraint-they should
resolve cases based solely on the language of statutes and the Constitution,
the intent of the framers, and the traditions of the American people. Justice
Scalia argues that Catholic justices should decide cases according to the
language in the law-even when that language leads to decisions that conflict with natural law, reason, and Catholic teaching-and that the place for
natural law is in the voting booth and legislative and constitutional halls. 57
Citizens and legislators should vote in light of natural law, but the judge's
job is to implement the laws that those other entities produce. He argues
that his own views have nothing to do with his legal decisions-he resolves
everything based on statutory and constitutional language and, if necessary,
believed that New Testament scripture required individuals to profess a Confession of Faith before
they could be baptized.").
53. See, e.g., Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty (1773), reprinted in
POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 334-35 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) and John
Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable (1791), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA at 1079. See also WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAP·
TISTS' STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630-1833 (1991).
54. Kuyper, supra note 26, at 197.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
57. See. e.g., Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, First THINGS (May 2002).
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American traditions. According to Justice Scalia, this type of judicial restraint should characterize American jurisprudence. 5x
I have a two-fold reaction to this argument. The first is to applaud. In
fact, the theory of judicial restraint is rooted in Catholic and evangelical
ways of thinking. As I argued previously, judicial restraint is attractive to
Catholic and evangelical legal thinkers because of its consistency with the
doctrines of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty.
But my second reaction is that there is a limit to the restraint that
judges can exercise. Judges must decide cases, and many cases require
judges to look beyond language and traditions. Many constitutional provisions are stated in broad general terms-freedom of religion, speech, and
the press, the rights to due process and to be secure in one's home. The
implications of these rights must be worked out in individual cases, many
arising from technologies and situations that could not have been envisioned by the Founders and for which the traditions of the American people
offer little guidance. Many statutes are written in vague terms because legislators could not come to agreement on their specif1cs. Many of the cases
that come before the Supreme Court come that far because there is no clear
outcome. That does not entitle justices to do whatever they want, but it
requires justices to exercise judgment, prudence, and practical wisdom. And
that judgment is likely to be affected by a judge's religious convictions, as
well as every other aspect of his or her life.
In my view, there is no alternative to religious faith affecting the way
that a judge decides cases. Some speak as if it is possible to be neutral. I
have bad news for those of you who want to separate religion from law: like
it or not, religious faith affects almost everything that we do. Most people
have the experience of setting aside their views (including religious views)
and dealing with an issue from another perspective. But when we try and
put our religious faith aside, that probably does not mean we operate on
neutral values; it is likely that we merely operate based on someone else's
religious values. Some sort of faith will affect a judge's work; it is just a
question of what faith it will be.
Even if it were possible for a judge to cordon off her religious views
from her judicial decision-making, I believe that she should not. In the first
place, this is a matter of fairness. Religiously-based moral values should not
be secondary to other moral values. I share the views of Stephen Carter and
Teresa Collett that in any situation where a judge appropriately relies on
moral values to make a jUdgment, religious moral values should have equal
standing with secular moral values. 59
58. Id.
59. See generallv Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Del'out fudge. 64 NOTRE DA'vIE L. REV.
932 (1989); Teresa S. Collett, "The King's Good Servam, hut God's First"-- The Role afReligio/1
ill fudicial Decisiollmakillg, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277 (2000),
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Second, judges of faith should bring the insights of their re1igious faith
to the task of judging, because that aspect of their character is probably one
of the reasons they were chosen to be judges. Most judges are chosen because they have functioned in a legal community for some time-long
enough for them to be perceived as persons with wisdom and moral insight.
They are chosen because of the character traits and moral insights they have
manifested and those character traits and moral insights are likely to be
rooted in their religious faith. They are chosen so they will bring those
character traits to the bench. Judges would fail to do the job they were
called to do if they did not draw on those insights, including insights
grounded in religious faith.
Third, Catholic and evangelical judges should bring their religious insights to the law because such insights generally are good for law. The
doctrines described above are good for law and they are good for people.
They are doctrines that correspond to the way that humans were made.
I will add a few caveats to my argument that religious faith should
affect judicial decision-making. First, a judge bringing her religious faith to
the process of decision making in a democracy does not mean that the Court
will or should adopt religious doctrines as law. As noted above, the doctrines of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty place significant limitations on
law. Religious freedom is grounded in the dignity of the person, and that
dignity must be respected by granting the right of conscience in a broad
range of aspects of human life. There is great practical wisdom in leaving
broad ranges of choices to individuals and intermediate communities.
In addition, as noted above, I do not believe that decisions should be
framed in religious terms. To do so would alienate citizens who do not
share that religious viewpoint. One of the beauties of natural law is that it
provides a language that is shared broadly. Most decisions can be expressed
in values that are broadly shared.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In closing, I will quote Alexander Bickel's classic book on the Supreme Court, The Least Dangerous Branch:
The function of the Justices [when faced with an issue not resolved by the ordinary sources of law] ... is to immerse themselves in the tradition of our society and of kindred societies that
have gone before, in history and in the sediment of history which
is law, and, as Judge Hand once suggested, in the thought and the
vision of the philosophers and the poets. The Justices will then be
fit to extract 'fundamental presuppositions' from their deepest
selves, but in fact from the evolving morality of our tradition. 60
60.
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My argument is that the "tradition of [American] society" includes its
religious traditions and that judges should consider not merely "the thought
and vision of [its] philosophers and [its] poets," but the thought and vision
of its theologians as well. When Catholic and evangelical justices extract
"fundamental presuppositions" from their deepest selves, they are likely to
draw on religious notions and those religious notions are an important part
of "the evolving morality of [the American] tradition."

